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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Scope1

This memorandum focuses on two aspects of crimes against humanity in Article 5 of the
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (the “ECCC
Statute”): The status of the enumerated offenses as customary international law in 1975, and the
evidentiary threshold of discriminatory intent for the chapeau of Article 5. The analysis begins
with a historical look at the evolution of crimes against humanity from the 1907 Hague
Convention through Nuremberg. The analysis uses the Charters of the International Military
Tribunal (“IMT”) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“IMTFE”) as well as
other international documents to prove the enumerated offenses were part of customary
international law in 1975.
To establish the evidentiary threshold of the discriminatory intent for the enumerated
offenses, the analysis looks to the treatment of discriminatory intent in customary international
law. Then, the analysis likens the ECCC Statute to close relatives such as the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). The analysis concludes that there is no
evidentiary threshold for discriminatory intent because discriminatory intent is a jurisdictional
limitation to crimes against humanity, and that the proper mechanism for dealing with the
jurisdictional limitation is through judicial notice.

1

Issue: Were the offences described in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute part of the customary
international law in 1975? Alternatively, were they applicable in Cambodia in 1975? What is
the evidentiary threshold of the discriminatory intent for Crimes Against Humanity described in
the chapeau of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute?
7
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B.
Summary of Conclusions
1.

The offenses described in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute were part of
customary international law in 1975 because:
i.

There was a general articulation of crimes against humanity
before the Nuremberg codification.

The general offense of crimes against humanity was first articulated in the 1907 Hague
Convention. This offense was reiterated in the 1919 Report of the Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the
Laws and Customs of War, and while left out of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, it was included in
the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. The combination of these instruments shows a general articulation of
crimes against humanity prior to Nuremberg.
ii.

The offenses of murder; extermination; enslavement;
deportation; persecutions on political, racial, and religious
grounds; and other inhumane acts were codified and
recognized prior to 1975.

The first codification of the enumerated offenses (excepting imprisonment, rape, and
torture) was the prosecution of the major war criminals under Article 6(c) of the Charter of the
IMT and Article 5(c) of the Charter IMTFE. Additionally the offenses were codified in Allied
Control Council Law No. 10 (“CCL No. 10”), the Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973, and the
1954 United Nations Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
iii.

The offenses of imprisonment; rape; and torture were codified
and recognized prior to 1975.

These offenses were explicitly enumerated in CCL No. 10 and Bangladesh Act No. XIX
of 1973. Implicitly, the offenses were recognized under the ‘other inhumane acts’ provision of
Article 6(c) of IMT Charter and Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter. Also, there was a prohibition
of these crimes in the laws of many of the world’s countries in 1944, as well as several U.N.
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resolutions prior to 1975 against torture, such as United Nations General Assembly Resolution
3059 (XXVIII) of 2 Nov. 1973, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3218 (XXIX) of 6
Nov. 1974, and General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.
iv.

The historical connection between crimes against humanity
and armed conflict ceased by 1975.

Article 5 of the ECCC Statute omits armed conflict as a requirement for crimes against
humanity. While Article 6(c) of the IMT and 5(c) of the IMTFE Charters required a connection
to war, CCL No. 10, which ended its prosecutions by 1955, and Bangladesh Act No. XIX of
1973 did not require armed conflict for crimes against humanity. Although Article 5(c) of the
ICTY Statute did include armed conflict, the commentary of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Tadić and ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreškić, and Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, suggest that the
nexus between armed conflict and crimes against humanity was not required by customary
international law in 1975.

2.

Discriminatory intent is not an element of all crimes against humanity
(excepting persecution-type offenses), rather it is a jurisdictional
limitation, and therefore has no evidentiary threshold.

There was no requirement of discriminatory intent in the prosecution of criminals under
6(c) of the IMT Charter, 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter, or CCL No. 10 for non-persecution type
offenses. The ICTY and ICTR, by using CCL No. 10, the IMT and IMTFE Charters as their
legal basis for enactment, endorse this view. For persecution-type offenses, the evidentiary
threshold is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
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3.
Discriminatory intent in the ECCC Statute should be handled by
judicial notice.
Although the ECCC internal rules do not contain an explicit judicial notice provision,
Article 12(1) of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea and ECCC Articles 20, 23, and 33 permit either the CoProsecutors, Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers to look at international procedural rules
for guidance. The ICTR, having a similar discriminatory intent limitation in its statute for crimes
against humanity, used a judicial notice provision to satisfy jurisdiction. Since the ICTR and
ECCC statutes are similar, and the ECCC Internal Rules permit consultation with international
procedural rules, the ECCC should use judicial notice to handle discriminatory intent.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Prior to Nuremberg

The 1907 Hague Convention Preamble originated the term “crimes against humanity”2:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of the public conscience.3 (Emphasis added)

2

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-humanity.htm (M. Cherif Bassiouni is a
leading academic on Crimes Against Humanity, President of the International Human Rights
Law Institute at DePaul University, and Professor of Law at DePaul University) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
3

The Hague Convention IV, 18 October 1907, available at
http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/hague/hague5.html [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 10].
10
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But crimes against humanity were not described as a category of international crime until the
1915 denunciation of the Ottoman massacre of the Armenians in Turkey (by France, Great
Britain, and Russia).4 This category was, however, included in the 1919 Report of the
Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties for
Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, yet it was left out of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.5
Still, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres between the Allies and Turkey permitted punishment of those
who committed “crimes against humanity.”6 This treaty, however, was never ratified and was
replaced with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which was silent on the punishment of crimes
against humanity.7 Despite the silence, M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that crimes against humanity
were at that time already recognized as an international crime, even if the actors responsible for
the Armenian massacre went unpunished.8 Caroline Fournet agrees with Bassiouni on the
recognition, arguing that the Treaty of Sèvres was “clear proof that states condemned [] crimes
against humanity and that there existed some general principles applicable to all states.”9

4

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992) at 168 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
5

Id. at 169.

6

Id. at 175.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

CAROLINE FOURNET, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: THEORIES, PRACTICE AND EVOLUTION
(Cameron May, 2006) at 30 (Dr. Caroline Fournet is a lecturer at Exeter University’s School of
Law) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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B.
Nuremberg
Crimes against humanity lacked definition as category of crime until the codification of
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter pursuant to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.10 This
codification was the first time that the prohibition of crimes against humanity was positively
stated in international law.11,12 They were also codified in Article II(c) of CCL No. 10 which was
enacted pursuant to both the London Agreement and the October 1943 Moscow Conference.13
Although the tribunals conducting trials pursuant to CCL No. 10 were not “international in their
composition,” CCL No. 10 was international law.14 Crimes against humanity were also codified
in Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter. But, after the IMT, IMTFE, and CCL No. 10, there were
no other significant changes in the codification of crimes against humanity for a long time. By
1955, the trials under CCL No. 10 had ended, and there was a period of silence until 1992,

10

See Bassiouni, supra note 2 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].

11

Id.

12

GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (T·M·C·Asser Press,
2005) at 216 (Gerhard Werle is a Professor of German and International Criminal Law at
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
13

The Moscow Conference, October 1943, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 13].
14

RICHARD MAY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (Transnational Publishers, 2002) at 5
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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except for a few national prosecutions of World War II crimes.15 There were “[n]o trials before
international criminal courts [] held subsequent to the Nuremberg trials until the early 1990s.”16

III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A.

The Offenses Described in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute were Part of
Customary International Law in 1975
1.

Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation; Persecutions on
Political, Racial, and Religious Grounds; and Other Inhumane Acts

Article 5 of the ECCC Statute reads:
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all
Suspects who committed crimes against humanity during the period 17 April
1975 to 6 January 1979.
Crimes Against Humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are any acts
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds,
such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

murder;
extermination;
enslavement;
deportation;
imprisonment;
torture;
rape;
persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds;
other inhumane acts.17

15

M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997) at 10
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
16

WERLE, supra note, at 218 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

17

LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF
CAMBODIA FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, Article 5, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/law.list.aspx
[hereinafter LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS] [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
13
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Except for imprisonment, torture, and rape, every offense here enumerated is present in
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated. 18
Similarly, the same offenses are present in Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter, but with a
minor variation in that persecutions are listed in the disjunctive and racial grounds are
removed19:
Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or
persecutions on political or racial grounds.20
The same offenses are also enumerated in the 1954 International Law Commission Draft Code of
Offenses:
Inhumane acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or
persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial,
religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities. 21

18

CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Article 6(c), 8 August 1945
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
19

FOURNET, supra note 9, at 33 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

20

CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, Article 5(c), 19
January 1946, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
21

1954 DRAFT CODE OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_3_1954.pdf
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
14
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Although, this draft code was intended to be a codification of the international law principles at
Nuremberg,22 it has never been definitively accepted by the U.N. General Assembly or by any
state.23 The reason the 1954 Draft Code was never definitively accepted, however, does not
appear to stem from a disagreement about the definition of crimes against humanity, but because
the crime of aggression was undefined.24 Allied Control Council Law No. 10 also contains all of
the enumerated offenses, but, as in Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter, the persecutions are listed
in the disjunctive:
Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic
laws of the country where perpetrated. 25
Despite the minor difference, CCL No. 10 was patterned after Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter.26
After CCL No. 10, there was one other formulation of crimes against humanity prior to 1975.27
This was Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973, which prohibited:
Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture, rape or other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population or persecutions on

22

Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 14 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

23

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME I CRIMES (Transnational
Publishers, Inc. 1986) at 85 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
24

Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 15 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

25

ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10: PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR
CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY, Article II(c), 20 December 1945
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
26

Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 7 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

27

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 228 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
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political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 28
The Bangladesh Act contained all of the enumerated offenses found in Article 5 of the ECCC
Statute. Bassiouni points out that the language of the Bangladesh Act, like that of CCL No. 10,
follows the language of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter.29
If the enumerated offenses in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute are prohibited by customary
international law under Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter, CCL
No. 10, and the Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973, then prohibition of those offenses was
customary international law in 1975. This is because the IMT charter, IMTFE charter, CCL No.
10, and the Bangladesh Act all existed before 1975. The offenses of murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, other inhumane acts, and persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds appear as enumerated offenses of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter and 5(c) of the IMTFE
Charter (sans “religious grounds”). CCL No. 10, patterned after the IMT charter, also includes
the offenses. Furthermore, Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973, an agreement not enacted pursuant
to the London Agreement but arguably patterned after Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter language,
includes all of the offenses.
2.

Imprisonment; Rape; and Torture

Imprisonment, rape, and torture, while not explicitly mentioned in Article 6(c) of the IMT
charter, implicitly fall under ‘other inhumane acts.’30 Explicitly, imprisonment, rape, and torture

28

Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihlnat.nsf/0/8F90915528D9B814C125727900353282 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 4].
29

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 229 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

30

FOURNET, supra note 9, at 32 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
16
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were included in Article II(c) of CCL No. 10,31 and Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973.32 Even
though imprisonment, rape, and torture were not explicitly defined in Article 6(c) of the IMT
charter, Bassiouni argues that ‘other inhumane acts’ from the charter could include rape or
imprisonment (as forcible confinement).33 Fournet agrees with Bassiouni that rape and
imprisonment “were supposedly included in the expression ‘other inhumane acts.’”34
As for torture, it was banned under the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.35 Torture made another appearance in the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:36 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”37 It was also the subject of General
Assembly Resolutions 305938 and 3218.39 Bassiouni also, in a survey of the 1944 laws of the

31

ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10: PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR
CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY, Article II(c), 20 December 1945
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
32

Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihlnat.nsf/0/8F90915528D9B814C125727900353282 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 4].
33

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 282 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

34

FOURNET, supra note 9, at 32 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

35

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 323 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

36

Id. at 324.

37

G.A. Res. 2200A, Art. 7, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
7].
38

G.A. Res. 3059, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. (Nov. 2, 1973) (rejection of torture) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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world’s countries, found that 39 of 74 countries existing in 1944 had laws against either torture,
or torture subsumed under crimes against physical integrity such as assault/battery.40 France significant because Cambodia was under French rule until 1953 - had a law against torture.41
Article 5 of the ECCC Statute includes imprisonment, rape, and torture – three offenses
not banned in 6(c) of the IMT Charter. One could argue that because the offenses are missing
from Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter that they were not customary international law in 1975.
But, this argument cannot be sustained because the offenses are explicitly banned in CCL No. 10
and Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973. Furthermore, since those two documents are patterned
after the language of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, it follows that rape, imprisonment, and
torture are somehow included in the language of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter. The most
likely operative section, as suggested by Fournet42 and Bassiouni43, is the ‘other inhumane acts’
provision. Torture has even more support as an offense against customary international law
because of its pedigree of being banned: the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, 1949 Geneva
Convention, and U.N. Resolutions.

39

G.A. Res. 3218, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. (Nov. 6, 1974) (reaffirming rejection of torture)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
40

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 285-286 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

41

Id.

42

FOURNET, supra note 9, at 32 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

43

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 282 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
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3.
Crimes Against Humanity and Armed Conflict
Article 5 of the ECCC statute does not contain a requirement that crimes against
humanity be committed in connection with armed conflict.44 Historically, the IMT and IMTFE
Charters included the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed in connection with
war.45, 46, 47 But, Bassiouni argues that the connection with war was merely to “strengthen [the]
legality [of crimes against humanity] by connecting it to the more established notion of war
crimes.”48 Crimes against humanity under CCL No. 10 dropped the link between the offense and
armed conflict.49
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić commented on the status of the connection with
armed conflict: “It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict . . . customary international
law may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.”50
Although Article 5 of the ICTY Statute requires the enumerated acts be committed during armed
44

See LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS, Article 5 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
45

BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 191 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

46

See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Article 6(c), 8 August 1945
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
47

See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, Article
5(c), 19 January 1946, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
48

Id. at 186.

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Judgment of 7 May 1997 (Trial Chamber) at ¶627
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
49

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Decision of 2 October 1995 (Appeals Chamber) at
¶141 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
50
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conflict, “customary international law no longer requires any nexus between crimes against
humanity and armed conflict” and the statutory armed conflict requirement was merely
“reintroduced [] for the purposes of [the ICTY].”51 The Trial Chamber in Tadić also noted that
the crimes against humanity provision in the ICTR Statute did not require armed conflict.52
The omission of armed conflict in the ICTR Statute, combined with the finding of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber that there is no armed conflict requirement, suggests that customary
international law does not require armed conflict as an element of crimes against humanity.
Although crimes against humanity were originally an outgrowth of war crimes and required a
connection to war under the IMT and IMTFE Charters53, CCL No. 10 severed the connection.
But if the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are codifications of customary international law in regard to
crimes against humanity, the difference in opinion on the requirement of armed conflict is
curious. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić, however, cleared up any confusion when it
stated that crimes against humanity no longer require a nexus with armed conflict. The ICTY
Trial Chamber in Kupreškić suggested the armed conflict requirement resulted in a definition of
crimes against humanity “more narrow[] than is necessary under customary international law.”54
If the Trial Chamber in Kupreškić believed the armed conflict requirement made the ICTY
Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity too narrow and the Appeals Chamber in Tadić
felt that crimes against humanity did not need an armed conflict, then it seems that the ICTY

51

Id. at ¶78.

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Judgment of 7 May 1997 (Trial Chamber) at ¶627
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
52

53

See Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 6 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

The Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16-T, Judgment of 14 January 2000 (Trial Chamber)
at ¶545 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
54
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endorses the ICTR Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity to the extent that it does not
require armed conflict. Since there were no prosecuted formulations of crimes against humanity
from CCL No. 10, until the ICTY and ICTR, then the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR and
interpretations of those statutes about the status of customary international law are valid
interpretations of customary international law in 1975. Therefore, because the ICTR Statute’s
omission of armed conflict is a valid statement of customary international law in 1975 with
regard to crimes against humanity, the ECCC statute, which also omits armed conflict, is also a
valid statement of customary international law in 1975.
B.

Discriminatory Intent as a Jurisdictional Limitation for Crimes Against
Humanity (Except Persecution-type Offenses)
1.

Non-Persecution-type Offenses

“[T]he legal basis for the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the [ICTY and ICTR]
was the Nuremberg Charter, Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the CCL No. 10 for
Germany.”55 The “ICTY and ICTR Statutes . . . follow[] the Second World War war crimes
trials.”56 The IMT Charter, IMTFE Charter, and CCL No. 10 required discriminatory intent only
for persecution-type crimes against humanity.57 True to Nuremberg, the ICTY Statute requires
discriminatory intent only for persecution-type crimes under Article 3(h), but the ICTR Statute

55

YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM THE AD HOC
TRIBUNALS TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Routledge 2004) at 241 (Dr.
Yusuf Aksar is an Assistant Professor of Public International Law at Karadeniz Technical
University) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
56

Id. at 244.

57

Id. at 251-252.
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requires it for all crimes against humanity.58 However, despite the differences in the text of the
ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, the differences “are not expressions of uncertainty about the scope
of the crime; [but] explained by the situational nature of the statutes.”59
Article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) also addresses
crimes against humanity.60 Like the ICTY Statute, Article 2 of the SCSL Statute does not
explicitly require that a “widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population” be
committed on discriminatory grounds: “The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute
persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population.”61 The omission of discriminatory grounds in Article 2 of the SCSL
Statute might be considered a definitive choice by the United Nations on the proper scope of
crimes against humanity because it was enacted subsequent to the ICTY and ICTR, but the fact
that the SCSL Statute was agreed upon after ICTY and ICTR Statutes suggests that it might not
be as reliable of an indicator of the status of customary international law in 1975 as the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes are.
Despite the fact that the ICTY Statute requires discriminatory intent only for persecutiontype crimes, the Report of the Secretary-General suggested otherwise.62 This report, combined

58

Id. at 251.

59

WERLE, supra note 12, at 219 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

60

STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, Article 2, available at http://www.scsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.html [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
61

Id.

AKSAR, supra note 52, at 252 (From Footnote 69: “The Report of the Secretary-General
defines crimes against humanity as ‘. . . inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as willful
killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
62
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with the interpretation of Article 5 by Security Council States (discriminatory intent is applicable
to all crimes against humanity), was persuasive to the Trial Chamber in Tadić.63 However, the
Trial Chamber did note “that it was departing from customary law, which did not require such
intent.”64 Yasuf Aksar suggests that the approach of the ICTY Trial Chamber in this case can be
criticized because it was required to apply customary international law instead of the Security
Council States’ interpretation or the Report of the Secretary-General.65 Instead, the Trial
Chamber should have followed the customary international law as codified in the IMT and
IMTFE Charters, CCL No. 10, and I.L.C. Draft Code which did not require discriminatory intent
for all crimes against humanity.66
The Tadić requirement of discriminatory intent was followed in the ICTR Trial Chamber
of the Akayesu case, holding “[t]he perpetrator must have the requisite intent for the commission
of crimes against humanity.”67 The evidentiary threshold applied by the ICTR for discriminatory
intent was “beyond a reasonable doubt”: “The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that . . .
the only reason they were killed is because they were Tutsi.”68
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.’”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Judgment of 7 May 1997 (Trial Chamber) at ¶652.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
63

64

FOURNET, supra note 9, at 54 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

65

AKSAR, supra note 52, at 252 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Judgment of 7 May 1997 (Trial Chamber) at ¶651,
¶652 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
66

67

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Decision 2 September 1998 at ¶¶583-584
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
68

Id. at ¶649, ¶658, ¶664, ¶667, ¶740.
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The holding of the Tadić Trial Chamber, requiring discriminatory intent for all crimes
against humanity, however, did not stand the test of time when it was appealed. The Tadić
Appeals Chamber reversed the holding on four grounds.69 First, with respect to statutory
interpretation, the ordinary meaning of the ICTY Statute reveals that discriminatory intent does
not apply to all crimes against humanity.70 Also, a requirement of discriminatory intent would
be “illogical and superfluous” in light of the persecutions crime.71 Interestingly, the Appeals
Chamber opined that if the discriminatory intent element was required, as suggested by the
Report of the Secretary-General, “the deportation of the urban educated of Cambodia under the
Khmer Rouge between 1975-1979 . . . would not fall under the ambit of crimes against
humanity.”72 Second, the requirement was inconsistent with customary international law.73
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter required discriminatory intent only for persecution-type offenses;
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population” did not require it.74 CCL No. 10 and the Charter of the IMTFE had
similar language.75 Also, that there have been few national prosecutions requiring discriminatory

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Judgment of 15 July 1999 (Appeals Chamber) at
¶¶281-305 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
69

70

Id. at ¶283.

71

Id. at ¶284.

72

Id. at ¶285.

73

Id. at ¶288.

74

Id. at ¶289.

75

Id.
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intent.76 Third, the Secretary-General’s report lacked sufficient legal weight because it is not
binding, and does not have the same authority as the ICTY Statute.77 The report was also
inconsistent with customary international law.78 Lastly, the statements of Russia, France, and the
United States were not “context” to be consulted because they were not part of any “agreement”
on the statute.79
The Tadić Appeals Chamber was followed in the ICTY decisions of Kupreškić,80
Blaškić,81 and Kordić and Čerkez.82 The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Akayesu agreed that
discriminatory intent was not an element of all crimes against humanity. It noted that under
ICTR Statute, the tribunal is given jurisdiction over crimes against humanity as known in

76

Id. at ¶290.

77

Id. at ¶295.

78

Id. at ¶296.

79

Id. at ¶300.

The Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16-T, Judgment of 14 January 2000 (Trial Chamber)
at ¶558 (“Subsequent to the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Prosecutor v. Tadić,
crimes against humanity need be committed with a discriminatory intent only with regard
to the category of ‘persecutions’”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
80

The Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, Judgment of 3 March 2000 (Trial Chamber) at ¶260
(“It ensues from the Tadić Appeal Judgement that for a widespread or systematic attack
and the resultant crimes – murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape or other inhumane acts with the exception of persecution – to be characterised as
crimes against humanity they need not have been perpetrated with the deliberate intent to
cause injury to a civilian population on the basis of specific characteristics”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
81

The Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment of 26 February 2001 (Trial
Chamber) at ¶186 (“It rejected the view that to constitute a crime against humanity all
relevant acts or omissions must be undertaken by the perpetrator on discriminatory grounds”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
82
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customary international law, subject to a further jurisdictional limitation.83 The limitation of
attacks on “certain discriminatory grounds” does not add a new substantive legal requirement for
crimes against humanity.84 The Trial Chamber in Kajajeli cited Akayesu and agreed:
Article 3 of the Statute provides that the attack against the civilian population be
committed on “national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds”. This
provision is jurisdictional in nature, limiting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to a
narrower category of Crimes, and not intended to alter the definition of Crimes
Against Humanity in International Law.85
So, while there was once a “difference in interpretation between the ICTY and the ICTR as
to . . . discriminatory intent [] for all crimes against humanity . . . the ICTY and later the ICTR
decided that discriminatory intent applied only to persecution, not to the other listed crimes
against humanity.”86 The effect can be seen in the Ntakirutimana case wherein the court
explicitly said discriminatory intent did not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: “[t]he
Accused need not have any discriminatory intent.”87 The ICTR statutory requirement that “all
crimes against humanity be committed ‘on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious

83

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Judgment of 1 June 2001 (Appeals
Chamber) at ¶465 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
84

Id. at ¶466.

85

The Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment of 1 December 2003 (Trial
Chamber) at ¶877 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
86

Patricia M. Wald, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, available at
http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume6_3/wald.pdf at 629 (Judge Wald was a Judge for
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from 1999-2001) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
87

The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T,
Judgment of 21 February 2003 at ¶812, ¶816 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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grounds’” is not a “requirement that limits the definition of the crime, but [is] a means of
restricting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”88
Yet, some advocate that discriminatory intent should be an element of all crimes against
humanity and not only of persecution crimes. Larry May argues for the additional
discriminatory intent element because he believes without it, there is not a “sufficient[] link
[between] the collective activity [and] the individual actor’s behavior in order to justify
prosecution.”89 May suggested the Court in R. v. Finta recognized discriminatory intent as an
element of crimes against humanity:90 “[c]rimes against humanity [have] the additional element
[] that the inhumane acts were based on discrimination against or the persecution of an
identifiable group of people.”91, 92 But, May does not include the later finding that “knowledge
on the part of the accused is strictly irrelevant to his individual culpability.”93 Instead of
recognizing discriminatory intent as a substantive element of crimes against humanity, as May
suggested, Finta seemed to suggest that discriminatory intent was a matter of jurisdiction.94

88

WERLE, supra note 12, at 219 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

89

LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT (Cambridge
University Press 2005) at 137 (Larry May is a Professor of Philosophy at Washington University
in St. Louis) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
90

Id. at 126.

91

Id. at 126.

92

R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 at ¶76 (R. v. Finta was a Canadian prosecution of Imre Finta,
a captain in the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed during World War II) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
Id. at ¶296 (“To forcibly confine or kidnap 8,167 people is equally blameworthy whether [the
accused] knew or did not know that they were Jews.”).
93

94

See Id. at ¶¶296-299.
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Since the legal basis for crimes against humanity in the ICTY and ICTR was the
Nuremberg Charter, Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and CCL No. 10, and the differences
between ICTY and ICTR are not differences in the scope of the crime, then it follows that the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes embody their principles. If the language of Article 5 of the ECCC
Statute resembles the language of either ICTR or the ICTY, then the language of Article 5 of the
ECCC Statute should be interpreted similarly because of the resemblance. Article 5 of the
ECCC Statute states:
Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are any acts
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds[.]95
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute bears a striking resemblance to ECCC Article 5 because both
require the attack to occur on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds[.]96
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute does not bear so close a resemblance:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population[.]97

95

LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS, Article 5 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
96

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, Article 3, available
at http://69.94.11.53/default.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
97

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF YUGOSLAVIA, Article 5, available
at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
16].
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If the language of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute more closely resembles the language of
ICTY Article 5, then it follows that the Tadić Appeals Chamber’s decision would be particularly
persuasive and there would be no argument that discriminatory intent applies to all crimes
against humanity. But, Article 5 of the ECCC Statute more closely resembles the language of
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, which was used by the Trial Chamber of Akayesu to hold that all
crimes against humanity require discriminatory intent. Thus, because the language of Article 5 of
the ECCC Statute more closely resembles the ICTR Statute and not the ICTY Statute, the ruling
of Tadić and other ICTY cases should have little influence over interpreting Article 5 of the
ECCC Statute. But, the Appeals Chamber of Akayesu generally endorsed the Appeals Chamber
in Tadić in the sense that the legal requirements of crimes against humanity under customary
international law do not require discriminatory intent except for persecution-type crimes.98 What
the Security Council did with the ICTR Statute was “limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over
crimes against humanity solely to cases where they were committed on discriminatory
grounds.”99
With the connection between the ICTY and ICTR Statutes clear, and the ICTR
requirement of attacks “on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” meaning a
jurisdictional limitation, the picture of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute becomes clear. The ECCC
Statute’s language requiring the attack be on “national, political, ethnical, racial or religious
grounds” is also a jurisdictional limitation. If the limitation is one of jurisdiction, and not an

98

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Judgment of 1 June 2001 (Appeals
Chamber) at ¶464 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
99

Id. at ¶465.
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additional legal requirement, then there is no evidentiary threshold. There is either jurisdiction
or there is not.
2.

Use of Judicial Notice to Satisfy Jurisdictional Limitation of
Discriminatory Intent

The decision of whether the crimes against humanity are committed on discriminatory
grounds should be dispatched of using judicial notice. In Karemera, the “Prosecution sought
judicial notice of the following:”
The following state of affairs existed in Rwanda between 6 April 1994 to 17 July 1994:
There were throughout Rwanda widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian
population based on Tutsi ethnic identification. During the attacks, some Rwandan
citizens killed or caused serious bodily or mental harm to person[s] perceived to be
Tutsi. As a result of the attacks, there were a large number of deaths of persons of Tutsi
ethnic identity.100
The Prosecution was denied judicial notice by the Trial Chamber on the grounds that the facts
sought to be noticed were “legal finding[s] . . . [] constitut[ing] an element of a crime against
humanity.”101 The Appeals Chamber, citing Semanza, held that the notice should have been
accepted by the Trial Chamber because the facts sought to be noticed by the Prosecution were
“notorious facts not subject to reasonable dispute.”102 Additionally, because the “notorious facts
were not subject to reasonable dispute,” the Trial Chamber was required to notice them under

100

The Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision of 16 June 2006 (Appeals
Chamber) at ¶26 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
101

Id.

Id. at ¶¶28-29 (From Semanza Appeal Judgement, ¶192: “The Appeals Chamber finds that
these judicially noted facts did not relieve the Prosecution of its burden of proof; they went only
to the manner in which the Prosecution could discharge that burden in respect of the production
of certain evidence which did not concern the acts done by the Appellant. When determining the
Appellant’s personal responsibility, the Trial Chamber relied on the facts it found on the basis of
the evidence adduced at trial.”)
102
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Rule 94(A) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence.103, 104 The Appeals Chamber further
commented that “the practice of judicial notice of facts of common knowledge is well
established in international criminal law.”105 Specifically:
there is no reasonable basis for disputing [that] during the 1994 attacks, “some Rwandan
citizens killed or caused serious bodily or mental harm to person[s] perceived to be
Tutsi. As a result of the attacks, there were a large number of deaths of persons of Tutsi
ethnic identity.” These facts are not only consistent with every judgement so far issued
by the Appeals and Trial Chambers of this Tribunal, but also with the essentially
universal consensus of historical accounts included in sources such as encyclopaedias and
history books. They are facts of common knowledge.106
Despite the procedural practice of the ICTR and customary international law, the ECCC Internal
Rules (Rev. 1) do not explicitly contain a judicial notice provision.107 However, Rule 2 of the
ECCC Internal Rules (Rev. 1) provides a procedure for dealing with issues that do not arise
under the Internal Rules:
Where in the course of ECCC proceedings, a question arises which is not addressed by
these IRs, the Co-Prosecutors, Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers shall decide in
accordance with Article 12(1) of the Agreement and Articles 20 new, 23 new, 33 new or
37 new of the ECCC Law as applicable, having particular attention to the fundamental
103

Id. at ¶29.

104

RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, 14 March 2008, Rule 94, available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/080314/080314.pdf [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 14].
Karemera, at ¶30. (Footnote 46: “See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for
Germany, art. 21; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 69(6); Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, Rule 94(A)”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23].
105

106

Id. at ¶31.

107

INTERNAL RULES OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 1
February 2008 Revision, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/27/Internal_Rules_Revision1_01-0208_eng.pdf [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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principles set out in Rule 21 and the applicable criminal procedural laws. In such a case, a
proposal for amendment of these IRs shall be submitted to the Rules and Procedure
Committee as soon as possible.108
Article 12(1) of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea and Articles 20, 23, and 33 of the ECCC Statute generally
hold that while the procedure must be in accordance with Cambodian Law, international
procedural rules may be consulted for guidance.109, 110
Since the Internal Rules for the ECCC do not appear to have an explicit judicial notice
section, ECCC Internal Rule 2 allows one of the actors – either the Co-Prosecutors, CoInvestigative Judges, or the Chambers – the discretion to look at international procedural rules.
The ICTR, an international tribunal, has a judicial notice rule. Furthermore, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber held, in Karemera, that the practice of judicial notice is well established in
international criminal law. While the Appeals Chamber in Karemera took judicial notice of the
attacks on Tutsis as an attack on ethnical grounds, the ECCC could take judicial notice of the
attacks on Cambodian civilians as an attack on political or national grounds. Following the
procedure of the ICTR Appeals Chamber to dispatch of the jurisdictional limitation on
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discriminatory grounds makes sense because of the similar discriminatory grounds requirements
for crimes against humanity in both the ICTR and ECCC Statutes.
3.

Persecution-type Offenses

“The crime of persecution differs [] from all other crimes against humanity [because it
requires discriminatory intent].”111 The ICTR Tribunal in Semanza agreed, “[u]nlike the other
enumerated crimes against humanity, persecution requires a discriminatory intent.”112 While,
“the actus reus of persecution may be identical to other crimes against humanity, what
distinguishes the crime of persecution is that it is committed on discriminatory grounds.”113
If persecution-type crimes against humanity do require discriminatory intent as one of the
legal requirements, then there is an evidentiary threshold. With the similarities in language
between Article 5 of the ECCC Statute and Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, it makes sense to look
at the interpretation of discriminatory intent practice for persecutions under the ICTR. The Trial
Chamber of Akayesu is particularly enlightening on this point as the Chamber applied the
standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” to determine discriminatory intent.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute were

well established in customary international law in 1975. The ECCC borrows language from
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter and Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter as well as from CCL No.
10, which was based on Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter. These international instruments
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codified customary international law and were consulted in formulating other laws on crimes
against humanity, such as Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973 or the 1954 I.L.C. Draft Code of
Offenses. The enumerated acts in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute not present in Article 6(c) of the
IMT Charter or Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter are covered by CCL No. 10 and the
Bangladesh Act. In addition, torture has specifically been the subject of numerous U.N.
Resolutions, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and the 1949 Geneva Convention.
Although crimes against humanity historically required a connection to armed conflict,
Article 5 of the ECCC Statute does not contain a link to armed conflict. Despite the omission,
Article 5 of the ECCC is still representative of customary international law in 1975 because CCL
No. 10 and Bangladesh Act No. XIX of 1973 severed the link between crimes against humanity
and armed conflict. The severing is evidenced by the omission of armed conflict in Article 3 of
the ICTR Statute, and the commentary of ICTY Tadić Appeals Chamber and Kupreškić Trial
Chamber in light of the presence of armed conflict in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.
The chapeau of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute does not require a discriminatory intent for
non-persecution-type acts and thus there is no evidentiary threshold. Customary international
law, as reflected in language of the IMT and IMTFE Charters, and CCL No. 10, does not require
discriminatory intent for non-persecution-type acts. While the early ICTY cases required an
evidentiary showing of discriminatory intent, the ICTY Appeals Chamber subsequently
overruled the requirement because it was not a requirement of the ICTY Statute, and it was not a
requirement under customary international law. Early ICTR cases required discriminatory
intent, but in light of the findings of the ICTY, decided that discriminatory intent was not a legal
element of non-persecution-type offenses of crimes against humanity. For the ICTR,
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discriminatory intent is merely a jurisdictional limitation to a particular subset of crimes against
humanity: those committed on “national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”
Satisfying the jurisdictional limitation can be accomplished through judicial notice.
Although the ECCC Internal Rules do not contain an explicit judicial notice provision, the
Internal Rules, ECCC Statute, and Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea permit using international procedural
rules for guidance. Since the ICTR contained a discriminatory intent jurisdictional limitation in
Article 3 of its statute similar to Article 5 of the ECCC Statute, the ECCC should consult the
ICTR for guidance on handling the jurisdictional limitation. The ICTR satisfies the
discriminatory intent limitation through the use of judicial notice, which is not only a
requirement in the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but, as the Karemera Appeals
Chamber remarked, “[a] well established [practice] in international criminal law.”114
For persecution-type crimes against humanity, it appears that discriminatory intent is
another legal requirement, and must be proved by the evidentiary threshold of the underlying
offense – generally, “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
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